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wouldbestraightforward,becausequalitywouldbereadilyapparent.Publicationwouldbe
quickandpainless,journalswouldreliablydistinguishhigh- from low-qualityresearch,and
journal rankwouldprovideagoodproxyfor researchquality.Sure,youmight feellike a
dreamer.Butyouwouldn't betheonly one[1±8].
Obviously,wedon't live in suchaworld.After all,scientistsareonly human.Wesometimes
struggleto explainwhyour work is important or forgetto write up critical aspectsof our
researchprotocols.Likeall humans,wealsoseekout information thatconfirmsour pre-exist-
ing beliefs,usebiasedreasoningstrategiesto arriveatpre-desiredconclusions,andself-deceive
to presentourselvesin abetterlight [9±11].Suchfactorscanleadusto overestimatethequality
of our work.And evenif wewereperfectlyawareof our work'squality,weareincentivizedto
presentit in anoverlypositivelight [6]. Oneconsequenceis thatweincreasinglydescribeour
researchasªamazingº,ªinspiringº, andªrobustº,despitethefactthatsuchresearchis increas-
ingly rare[12,13].Wethensubmitthis researchto high-rankingjournals,in part,becauseour
careersbenefitfrom publishingin prestigiousandimpactfuloutlets[14±17].Asaconse-
quence,journaleditorsandpeerreviewersmustinvestconsiderabletime andeffort to distin-
guishhigh- from low-qualityresearch.While thisprocessdoeshelpto filter work by its
quality,it is slowandunreliable,anddependson reviewers'limited goodwill [7, 18±20].Asa
result,low-qualityresearchgetspublishedin high-rankingjournals[21±23].An unfortunate
propertyof thissystemis that journal rankprovidesapoorproxyfor researchquality[24].
And to top it off, wearewellawareof theseproblems,andregularlycomplainthat thepublish-




flictsof interestthat incentivizescientiststo deceivejournalsaboutaspectsof their research.
Notethat theterm ªdeceptionºisusedto referto behaviorsin whichindividualscommunicate
information thatdoesnot accurately(i.e.,honestly)reflectsomeunderlyingstate.Thispaper
makesno assumptionsaboutthemotivesof individual scientistsor themechanismsbywhich
deceptionoccurs.
Information asymmetries and conflicts of interest in academic publishing
Academicjournalsarevulnerableto deception.Thisvulnerabilityexistsfor two interrelated
reasons.First,thereareinformation asymmetriesbetweenscientistsandjournals,asscientists
havemoreinformation aboutaspectsof their researchthanispresentedin apaper(e.g.,what
therawdatalook like, thescientists'originalpredictionsversusthosereported,whatoccurred
during data-collectionandanalysisversuswhatwaswritten up) [26]. Second,therearecon-
flictsof interestbetweenscientistsandjournals.Forexample,scientistshaveanincentiveto
publisheachpaperin ahigh-rankingjournal,but high-rankingjournalspreferto publishonly
asubsetof papers(e.g.,thosewith rigorousmethods,compellingevidence,or novelresults).
Bygettingresearchpublishedin high-rankingjournalsregardlessof its truevalue,scientists
canreapthebenefitsof high-rankingpublicationswithout doinghigh-valueresearch[17].
Onedimensionalongwhich journalsarevulnerableto deceptionis researchquality,and
suchdeceptionimposescostson thescientificcommunity.First,if low-qualityresearchis
ªdeceptivelyºsubmittedto high-rankingjournals,editorsandreviewersmustwastetime eval-
uatingandfiltering out low-qualitysubmissions.Thisextratime burdenreducestheefficiency
of science.Second,becausepeer-reviewis imperfect,somelow-qualitypaperswill ªslip
throughthecracksºandbepublishedin high-rankingjournals.Asaconsequence,anycorrela-
tion betweenjournal rankandpaperqualitywill bereduced.Thisreducedcorrelationimpedes
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accuratedecision-making,asscientistsrelyon journal rank to decidewhichpapersto read,
whichresearchparadigmsto emulate,andwhichscientiststo hire andfund [3, 16,17,27].
Third, if low-qualityresearchrequireslesstime to conductthanhigh-qualityresearchbut can
still bepublishedin high-rankingjournals,thenscientistshavelittle incentiveto investin
high-qualityresearch.Thiscanresultin adverseselection:high-qualityresearchisdrivenout
of theacademicmarketuntil low-qualityresearchisall that remains[26,28].
Theproblemof deceptionin communicationsystemsisnot uniqueto academicpublishing
Ðwheneverthereareinformation asymmetriesandconflictsof interest,thereareincentivesto
deceive.Considerthreeexamples.
1. A motherbird bringsfoodbackto hernestandmustdecidewhichnestlingto feed.The
motherprefersto feedherhungriestchild,andthusbenefitsfrom knowinghowmuchfood
eachchild needs.Buteachchild maypreferto receivethefoodfor itself.That is,themother
wouldbenefitif herchildrenhonestlycommunicatedtheir levelof hunger,but eachchild
maybenefitfrom deceivingits motherbyclaimingto bethehungriest.
2. A family needsanewcaranddecidesto buyfrom aused-cardealership.Thefamilyprefers




from deceivingthefamily byclaimingthatanunreliablecarisof high-quality.
3. A universitydepartmentishiring anewfacultymemberandinvitesthreecandidatesto
givejob talks.All elseequal,thedepartmentprefersto hire arigorousscholarÐonewho
carefullythinks througheachproject,usesrigorousmethods,andtransparentlyreportsall
resultsandanalyses.Buteachcandidateprefersto getajob,evenif theyarenot rigorous.
That is,departmentswouldbenefitif job candidatesgavetalksthathonestlycommunicated
their scholarlyrigor, but candidatesbenefitfrom deceivingdepartmentsbyonly communi-
catinginformation thatmakesthemseemrigorous(evenif theyarenot).
How canhonestybeensureddespiteincentivesfor deception?Thetheoryof honestsignal-
ing canshedlight on thisquestion.In economics[29,30]andbiology[31,32],signalingtheory
representsanattemptto understandhowhonestcommunicationcanexistin situationswhere
thereappearto beincentivesfor dishonesty.Below,weapplythelogicof signalingtheoryto
thepublicationprocessusingasetof formal theoreticalmodels.This formalapproachhassev-
eralaffordances,includingmakingassumptionsclearandexplicit,ensuringthatarguments
arelogicallycoherent,andproviding insightsinto questionsthataredifficult to intuit (e.g.,
shouldpublishingbemadeasefficientaspossiblesothatpaperscanberapidlysubmittedand
evaluatedbyreviewers,or might removingpublishinginefficiencieshaveunintendedconse-
quences?).However,our approachalsohasimportant limitations (seeDiscussion).
A simple model of academic publishing
Forsimplicity,assumethatascientistproducestwo kindsof papers:high-qualityandlow-




atoryandconfirmatoryfindings(see[5] for otherfactorsthataffectresearchquality).In con-
trast,a low-qualitypapermayhavefeweror noneof thesequalities.In reality,scientistsmay
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disagreeaboutwhichmethodsor analysesarebest,but thereisoftenconsensusthatcertain
practicesreduceresearchquality.
Conditionalon paperquality,thescientistdecideswhetherto submitto ahigh- or low-
rankingjournal (becausesubmissionisconditionedon papertype,theproportion of high- or
low-qualitypapersisnot relevantto our model).Publishingin ahigh-rankingjournal results
in payoffB, whilepublishingin alow-rankingjournal resultsin payoffb, whereB> b. These
payoffsrepresentall thebenefitsthatascientistmayreceivefrom publication,includingpres-
tige,promotion,citations,or anincreasedprobabilityof obtainingfuture funding.
Journalshaveimperfectinformation aboutthequalityof submittedpapersandthusproba-
bilisticallydeterminesubmissionquality.High-rankingjournalsaccepthigh- andlow-quality
paperswith probabilitiesPh andPl, respectively.Weassumethathigh-rankingjournalsare
morelikely to accepthigh-qualitythanlow-qualitypapers(Ph> Pl). Thescreeningprocess
thatmakeshigh-qualitypapershaveahigherprobabilityof acceptancecouldoccurviavarious
mechanisms(e.g.,editorscreening;peer-reviewerevaluation).If apaperis rejectedfrom a
high-rankingjournal,thescientistresubmitsthepaperto alow-rankingjournal.Weassume
that low-rankingjournalsacceptall submittedpapers.Thisassumptionmakesthemodeleasier




asthefixedpayoffto ascientistwhocutstheir lossesandchoosesnot to submittheir work for
publication.
In thismodelandsubsequentmodifications,wefocuson situationsin whichscientistsstra-
tegicallysubmitpapersto journalsandjournalsadoptfixedbehaviors.However,our qualita-
tiveresultsgeneralizeto amodelin whichjournalsarealsostrategicactors(seeS1FileandS1
Fig).Theassumptionof fixedjournalbehaviorsis reasonableif scientistscanadjusttheir
behavioron shortertimescalesthancanacademicjournals.Further,it allowsusto simplyillus-
tratethesamemechanismsthatensurehonestyin truesignalinggameswith two-sidedstrate-
gic interaction(e.g.,differentialbenefitsanddifferentialcosts)[33].
Giventhismodel,whereshouldascientistsendhigh- andlow-qualitywork in orderto
maximizetheir payoffs?
A high-qualitypaperisworth submittingto ahigh-rankingjournal insteadof alow-ranking
journalwhen:
BPh þ bð1   PhÞ > b
PhðB   bÞ > 0 ð1Þ
A low-qualitypaperisworth submittingto ahigh-rankingjournal insteadof alow-ranking
journalwhen:
BPl þ bð1   PlÞ > b
PlðB   bÞ > 0 ð2Þ
Bothconditionsaresatisfiedif 1) ascientistcanpublishin ahigh-rankingjournalwith non-
zeroprobabilityand2) ahigh-rankingpublicationisworth morethanalow-rankingpublica-
tion. In otherwords,in thismodel,scientistsbenefitfrom submittingall papersto high-rank-
ing journals,regardlessof paperquality.
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This illustratesakeyconflict of interestin academicpublishing.Scientistsareincentivized
to signalthat their work ishigh-quality(evenwhenit isnot), whereasjournalspreferto know
thetruequalityof thework.However,thisconflict canberesolvedbychangingpublishing
incentives.Making journal submissionscostlyisonemechanismfor doingso.
Submission costs
Now assumethatsubmittingapaperfor publicationiscostly.Suchcostscouldincludeany
aspectof thesubmissionprocessthat requirestime (e.g.,writing acompellingcoverletter,
meetingstringentformattingrequirements,waitingfor ajournal'sdecision)or money(e.g.,
submissionfees),independentof paperquality.Thesecostscanbeconceptualizedaseither
originatingfrom thescientist(e.g.,asignal)or asbeingenforcedby thejournal (e.g.,ascreen-
ing mechanism)[34]. Assumethatscientistspayacost,C, to submitapaperto ahigh-ranking
journalandacost,c, to submitapaperto alow-rankingjournal,whereB> C andb> c. All
scientistspayacostonce,but thosewhosepapersarerejectedfrom thehigh-rankingjournal
andarere-submittedto thelow-rankingjournalpaybothcosts.Formathematicalsimplicity,
weanalyzeacasewherec = 0, anddo not includec in our analyses.Thequalitativeresultsare
identicalin caseswherelow-rankingsubmissionshaveanon-zerocost(seeS1File).
With theadditionof submissioncosts,howshouldascientistnowbehave?A high-quality
paperisworth submittingto ahigh-rankingjournal insteadof alow-rankingjournalwhen:
BPh þ bð1   PhÞ   C > b
PhðB   bÞ > C ð3Þ
A low-qualitypaperisworth submittingto ahigh-rankingjournal insteadof alow-ranking
journalwhen:
BPl þ bð1   PlÞ   C > b
PlðB   bÞ > C ð4Þ
With submissioncosts,scientistsonly submitto high-rankingjournalswhenthebenefitsof
doingsooutweighthecosts.
Separating high-quality from low-quality papers. Eqs(3) and(4) definetheconditions
underwhicheachkind of papershouldbesubmittedto ahigh-rankingjournal.If weseekto




PhðB   bÞ   C > 0 > PlðB   bÞ   C
PhðB   bÞ > C > PlðB   bÞ ð5Þ
Introducingsubmissioncostscreatesarangeof parametersin whichhonestsubmissionispos-




Honestyispossiblewhenthecostof high-rankingsubmission,C, is largerthantheexpected
addedbenefitof submittingalow-qualitypaperto ahigh-rankingjournal,Pl (B–b), but smaller
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thantheexpectedaddedbenefitof submittingahigh-qualitypaperto ahigh-rankingjournal,
Ph (B–b). Ashigh-rankingpublicationsbecomeworth morethanlow-rankingpublications
(largervaluesof B–b), largersubmissioncostsarerequiredto ensurehonestsubmission;other-
wise,scientistswill betemptedto submitall papersto high-rankingjournals.However,if sub-
missioncostsaretoo large,no separationexists,asno paperisworth submittingto ahigh-
rankingjournal.Asjournalsbecomebetterableto differentiatehigh- from low-qualitypapers





casewherejournalscannottell thedifferencebetweenhigh- andlow-qualitypapers(Ph = Pl),
honestsubmissioncannotexist,becausescientistslackanyincentiveto condition journal sub-
missionon paperquality.
In theabovemodel,all scientistsreceivedthesamebenefitfor high-rankingpublicationsÐ
differentialbenefitsarosebecauseof differentacceptanceprobabilitiesfor high- andlow-qual-




erentiallychosenfor direct replication[21±23]andmaybemoreheavilyscrutinizedfor errors
andfraud[24,37],which increasestheprobabilitythat low-qualitypapersin high-ranking
journalsaredetected.




38].In thecontextof our model,thiswouldmeanthatsubmissioncostsdiffer dependingon
paperquality.Examplesof suchdifferentialcostscouldincludepeer-reviewtakinglongerfor
low-qualitypapers[39] or it beingmoredifficult to presentlow-qualitywork ascompelling
research(justasit maybeharderto write compellinggrantproposalsfor badideasthangood
ones[40]).
Assumethatscientistspayex ante submissioncostsCl andCh to submitlow- andhigh-qual-
ity papers,respectively,to high-rankingjournals,wherelow-qualitypapershavehighersub-
missioncosts(Cl> Ch). With differentialcosts,ahigh-qualitypaperisworth submittingto a
high-rankingjournal insteadof alow-rankingjournalwhen:
PhðB   bÞ > Ch ð6Þ
A low-qualitypaperisworth submittingto ahigh-rankingjournal insteadof alow-ranking
journalwhen:
PlðB   bÞ > Cl
Rewritingthis inequalityto expresslow- andhigh-rankingsubmissioncostsin thesameunits,
substituteCl = kCh, wherek> 1. Theinequalitythusbecomes:
PlðB   bÞ > kCh ð7Þ
A separatingequilibrium,suchthatscientistssubmitonly high-qualitypapersto high-ranking
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journals,existswhen:




Asin thedifferential-benefitsonly model(Eq5),honestsubmissionismorelikely whenjour-
nalscanreliablydifferentiatebetweenhigh- andlow-qualitypapers.Therangeof conditions
for honestybecomeslargerassubmittinglow- versushigh-qualitypapersto high-ranking
journalsbecomesrelativelycostlier(largevaluesof k). Differentialcostspromotehonestsub-
mission(regardlessof whetherscientistsreceivedifferentialbenefits)by reducingtherelative
payoffof submittinglow- versushigh-qualitypapersto high-rankingjournals.
Costs for resubmitting rejected papers
In thepreviousmodels,weassumedthat initial submissionswerecostly,but that therewasno
uniquecostto resubmittingrejectedpapersto low-rankingjournals.Below,wemodify this
assumptionbymakingresubmissioncostly.Resubmissioncostsmaybeimportant if papers
rejectedfrom high-rankingjournalshavealowerexpectedvaluedueto anincreasedprobabil-
ity of beingªscoopedºor takelongerto publishelsewherebecausescientistsmustmakefor-
mattingmodifications.Alternatively,if decisionlettersandreviewsareopenlyavailable[41],
rejectedpapersmaylosevalueif otherscientistslowertheir assessmentof apaper'squality
basedon previousnegativereviews.
Consideramodifiedversionof thedifferential-benefitsmodel(Eq5) suchthat re-submit-
ting papersrejectedfrom high-rankingjournalshasacost,cr, wherecr< b. A high-quality
paperisworth submittingto ahigh-rankingjournal insteadof alow-rankingjournalwhen:
BPh þ ð1   PhÞðb   crÞ   C > b
PhðB   bþ crÞ > C þ cr ð9Þ
A low-qualitypaperisworth submittingto ahigh-rankingjournal insteadof alow-ranking
journalwhen:
BPl þ ð1   PlÞðb   crÞ   C > b
PlðB   bþ crÞ > C þ cr ð10Þ








rankingjournals.Thiscanensurehonesty,evenwheninitial submissionsarecostfree(C = 0).
Limiting the number of submissions: A cost-free mechanism to ensure
honesty
Wehavethusfar assumedthatscientistscouldresubmitrejectedpapersto low-rankingjour-
nals.This ishowacademicpublishingtendsto work: scientistscanindefinitelyresubmita
paperuntil it isacceptedsomewhere[14]. However,suchasystemallowsauthorsto imposea
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largeburdenon editorsandreviewers.Might it bebeneficialto limit submissionsin some
way?Below,wemodify our modelsuchthat resubmissionsarenot possible.Thiscouldrepre-
sentasituationin whichpaperscanonly besubmittedalimited numberof times[39] (see[4]
for arelatedideaaboutlimiting scientists'lifetimenumberof publicationsand[42] for a
relatedproposalto limit scientiststo onepublicationperyear).Alternatively,it couldrepresent
asituationin whichthecostof resubmittingpapersto low-rankingjournalsis largerthanthe
benefitof low-rankingpublications(cr> b), suchthatscientistshaveno incentiveto resubmit
rejectedpapers.Whethersuchreformsarefeasibleor desirableisunclear,but their logicalcon-
sequencesareimportant to understand.
Forsimplicity,assumethatscientistscanonly submiteachpaperto onejournalandthatall
submissionsarecost-free.A high-qualitypaperisworth submittingto ahigh-rankingjournal
insteadof alow-rankingjournalwhen:
BPh > b ð12Þ
A low-qualitypaperisworth submittingto ahigh-rankingjournal insteadof alow-ranking
journalwhen:
BPl > b ð13Þ
Thus,aseparatingequilibrium,suchthatscientistssubmitonly high-qualitypapersto high-
rankingjournals,existswhen:
BPh > b > BPl ð14Þ
Limiting thenumberof submissionscanensurehonesty,evenif submissioniscost-free.Asin
thepreviousmodels,therangeof conditionsfor honestybecomeslargerwhenjournalscan
reliablydifferentiatebetweenhigh- andlow-qualitypapers(largevaluesof Ph−Pl). If high-
rankingpublicationsareworth muchmorethanlow-rankingones(B >> b), honestsubmis-
sioncanonly existif low-qualitypapersareusuallyrejectedfrom high-rankingjournals.In
contrast,if high-rankingpublicationsarenot worth muchmorethanlow-rankingones(small
valuesof B–b), honestsubmissioncanonly existif high-qualitypapersareusuallyacceptedby
high-rankingjournals.
Limiting thenumberof submissionsworksbecausescientistsreceiveno payoffwhena
paperis rejected.In contrast,in thepreviousmodels,scientistscouldresubmitrejectedpapers





whichpaperscouldonly besubmittedonce.In therealworld, less-strictsubmissionlimita-
tionsmaybemorefeasible,but themechanismbywhich limiting submissionsensureshonesty
wouldstill apply.
Relation to existing models in economics
Similarquestionsregardingsignaling[30,43,44]andincentivestructuresin academicpub-
lishing[45±47]havealonghistoryof studyin economics.Most relevantto our paper,models
haveanalyzedtheoptimalorder in whichauthorsshouldsubmitpapersto academicjournals,
conditionalon varyingpayoffsto publication,acceptanceprobabilities,publicationdelays,and
authors'levelsof impatience[39,48±52].Forexample,in onemodelof editorialdelayand
optimalsubmissionstrategies[48], authorsknowthequalityof their papersandpreferto
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publisheachpaperin atop journal,but top journalshavehigherrejectionrates,papersubmis-
sioniscostly,andauthorsexperienceatime delaybetweenrejectionandresubmission.If sub-
missioncostsandresubmissiondelaysaresufficientlylow, thenauthors'optimalpolicyis to
initially submitpapersto theverytop journalandsubsequentlywork downthejournalhierar-
chy.However,assubmissioncostsandresubmissiondelaysincrease,authorsareincentivized
to makeinitial submissionsto lower-rankingjournals,therebydecreasingjournals'overall
reviewingburden(see[49,53] for theroleof differenttypesof publishingcosts).In another
game-theoreticmodelof theacademicreviewprocesswhereauthorshavemoreinformation
aboutpaperqualitythando journals,journalscanincreasetheaveragequalityof their pub-
lishedpapersby increasingsubmissioncostsandreducingthenoisinessof thereviewprocess,
bothof whichdisincentivizeauthorsfrom submittinglow-qualitypapersfor publication[54].
Similarqualitativefindingshaveemergedin severalothermodels[50,51].
Despitetheir potentialto inform currentdiscussionson scientificreform,theaforemen-
tionedmodelsarenot widelyappreciatedoutsideof economics.In part,this isdueto their
mathematicalcomplexity,narrowtargetaudience,andlackof connectionto theburgeoning
scientific-reformmovement[5]. Our paperaddressesthesegapsbydevelopingsimplemodels
that relateexplicitlyto proposalsfor scientificreform.Wealsogobeyondeconomictheory
andincorporateconceptsfrom thetheoryof honestsignalingin evolutionarybiology(e.g.,dif-
ferentialbenefitsanddifferentialcosts),whichprovidepowerfulconceptualtoolsfor thinking
abouthowto ensurehonestcommunication.Theexplicitapplicationof thesemodelsto recent
proposalsfor scientificreform isessential,becausethepracticalutility of modelsdependson
thenarrativewithin whichtheyareembedded[55].
Implications
Our modelshaveimplicationsfor howto modify academicpublishingto promotehonest
papersubmission,andprovidearangeof insightsregardingtherepercussionsof variouspub-
lishingreforms.




andpeer-reviewof manuscripts[56]) andseemingly-outdatednorms(e.g.,writing coverlet-
ters)[7, 8,57±59].Asaresult,academicjournalslowersubmissioncostsbyofferingrapid
turnaroundtimes(e.g.,Nature, Science [60,61]),allowingauthorsto payfor expeditedpeer-
review(e.g.,Scientific Reports [62]), offeringªshort reportº formats[63,64],or recommending









aretoo low to ensureseparatingequilibria,thereexistªhybridº equilibriawherereceiversof
signalsengagein randomrejectionbehaviorto preventbeingexploitedbydeceptivesignalers
[33]. Asaresult,honestsignalersaresometimesmistakenfor dishonestsignalersandhonest
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signalsarerejectedmorefrequentlythanin thehigher-costseparatingequilibrium. In aca-
demicpublishing,well-meaningreformsto reducepublicationcostscouldinadvertentlylead




tion in thelargerscientificecosystemmaybecounterproductive.An important questionis
whetherthecostsimposedon scientistsareoutweighedby thebenefitsof ensuringhonestsub-
mission.Thiswill not alwaysbethecase.Forexample,in research-fundingcompetitions,the
aggregatecostof writing proposalsmayoutweighthesocietalbenefitsof differentiating
betweenhigh- andlow-qualityprojects[40]. Similarly,thehighsignalcostsnecessaryto
ensurehonestcommunicationcanleavebothsignalersandreceiversworseoff thanin asystem
without anycommunication[66]. Makingsubmissioncoststoo largecouldalsodissuadesci-
entistsfrom submittingto high-rankingjournals(e.g.,SpringerNature's.Thefactthatsome
high-rankingjournals(e.g.,Nature, Science, PNAS) continueto attractmanypapersandare
preferentiallytargetedfor initial submissionsuggeststhatcurrentsubmissioncostsarenot
thisexcessive[14,67].
Better peer review promotes honest journal submission
If journalspreferentiallyaccepthigh- versuslow-qualityresearch,givensufficientsubmission
costs,scientistswill not benefitfrom submittinglow-qualitypapersto high-rankingjournals.
Ensuringthisoutcomerequiresthat journalsreliablydifferentiatebetweenhigh- andlow-
qualitywork. In theory,peerreviewis theprimary pre-publicationmechanismfor doingso.
But in practice,peer-reviewregularlyfailsto differentiatebetweensubmissionsof varying
quality[18±20,68].Improving thequalityof peer-reviewisamajorchallenge,andsome
minor reforms(e.g.,short-termeducationalinterventions)havehadlimited success[69]. This
suggeststhatmoresubstantialchanges houldbeconsidered.Thespaceof possibilitiesfor
suchreformsis large,andincludesoutsourcingpeer-reviewto highly-trainedexperts[70], har-
nessingthewisdomof crowdsviavariousformsof openpeer-review[71], allowingscientists
to evaluateeachother'speer-reviewquality[72], andsupplementingpeerreviewwith "red
teams"of independentcritics[73]. However,becauseimprovingpeer-reviewmaybecostlyfor
journals,it is important to considerwhethersuchcostsareoutweighedby thebenefitsof better
discriminationbetweenhigh- andlow-qualitypapers[54].
Transparent research practices promote honest journal submission
Improving peerreviewers'ability to distinguishlow- from high-qualitypapersisdifficult. In
part,this isbecausereviewerslackrelevantinformation to assessubmissionquality[26], a
problemthat isexacerbatedbyshort-reportarticleformats[64]. Onesolutionis to reduce
information asymmetriesbymandatingtransparentandopenresearchpractices.Mechanisms
for doingsoincludepre-registration,opensharingof dataandmaterials[26], validatinganaly-
sesbeforepublication[41], removingword limits from themethodsandresultssectionsof
manuscripts[74], requiringresearchdisclosurestatementsalongwith submissions[75,76],or
requiringscientiststo indicatewhethertheir work adheresto varioustransparencystandards
(e.g.,viathecuratescience.orgWebplatform[77]).
It isworth noting thatsuchreformspotentiallyincreasethecostof peer-review,because
reviewersspendextratime evaluatingpre-registrations,checkingrawdata,andre-running
analyses.Without compensatingsuchcosts(e.g.,financialrewards),reviewerswill haveeven
fewerincentivesto do agoodjob.A similarproblemexistsin animalcommunication:if
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assessingsignalveracityis too costly,receiversof signalsmaybebetteroff bysettlingfor sig-
nalsthatarelessreliable[78]. Thishighlightstheimportanceof ongoingeffortsto reduce
peer-reviewcostsfor paperswith opendataandpre-registeredresearch(e.g.,SMARTpre-reg-
istration[79], machine-readablehypothesistests[80]).
Reducing the relative benefit of publishing low-quality papers in high-
ranking journals promotes honest journal submission
Honestsubmissionismorelikely if low-quality,high-rankingpublicationsarelessbeneficial
thanhigh-quality,high-rankingpublications.Waysto generatesuchdifferentialbenefits
includetargetinghigh-rankingpublicationsfor direct replication[81,82],or preferentially
scrutinizingthemfor questionableresearchpractices[75] andstatistical/mathematicalerrors
[83,84].Thiswould increasetheprobabilitythat low-qualitypapersaredetectedpost-publica-
tion. Subsequently,scientistsshouldpaycoststhat reducethebenefitsassociatedwith such
publications.Thesemight includefinancialpenalties,fewercitationsfor thepublishedpaper,
or reputationaldamage(e.g.,fewercitationsfor futurework or loweracceptanceprobabilities
for futurepapers[85]). Thefactthat retractionratescorrelatepositivelywith journal impact
factorsuggeststhathigh-rankingpublicationsalreadyreceiveextrascrutiny[24]. However,
thefactthatmanyhigh-rankingfindingsfail to replicate[21±23]suggeststhatcurrent levelsof
scrutinyarenot sufficientto ensurethatonly high-qualitywork issubmittedto high-ranking
journals[86].
Costs for resubmitting rejected papers promote honest journal submission
Assubmissionandresubmissioncostsbecomesmaller,scientistshavegreaterincentivesto ini-
tially submitall papersto high-rankingjournals,becausegettingrejectedisnot verycostly.
Resubmissioncostssolvethisproblembymakingrejectioncostly,whichdisproportionately
affectslow-qualitysubmissions.In principle,suchcostscouldbeimplementedin severalways.









plausiblewayto increasedifferentialcosts.Forexample,to theextentthat low-qualitypapers
aremorelikely to receivenegativereviews,scientistswill havefewerincentivesto submitsuch
papersto high-rankingjournals,becausereceivingnegativereviewscoulddecreasetheproba-
bility that thepaperispublishedelsewhere,decreaseits perceivedscientificvalueoncepub-
lished,or harmscientists'reputations.
Limiting the number of submissions (or rejections) per paper promotes
honest journal submission
Whenscientistscanindefinitelysubmitpapersfor publicationandsubmissioniscost-freeor
sufficientlylow-cost,scientistsareincentivizedto submitall papersto high-rankingjournals.
Limiting thenumberof timesthatpaperscanbesubmittedor rejectedsolvesthisproblemby
introducingopportunitycosts:submittingto onejournalmeanslosingout on thechanceto
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submitelsewhere[39]. If paperswereassigneduniqueidentifiersbeforeinitial submission,
journalscouldpotentiallytracksubmissionhistoriesandrejectpapersthathadbeensubmitted





Wehaveshownhowhonestsignalingtheoryprovidesatool for thinking aboutacademicpub-
lishing.Makingsubmissioncostlycandisincentivizescientistsfrom ªdeceptivelyºsubmitting
low-qualitywork to high-rankingjournals.Honestsubmissionismorelikely when1) journals
canreliablydifferentiatehigh- from low-qualitypapers,2) high-quality,high-rankingpublica-
tionsaremorebeneficialthanlow-quality,high-rankingpublications,and3) low-quality
papersarecostlierto submitto high-rankingjournalsthanhigh-qualitypapers.Whenjournal
submissioniscostfreeor sufficientlylow-cost,scientistsareincentivizedto submitall papers
to high-rankingjournals,unless4) resubmissioniscostlyor 5) thenumberof submissionsis
limited.
Our paperprovidesaformal frameworkfor thinking aboutawiderangeof deceptivepub-
lishingbehaviors,without requiringanyassumptionsaboutscientists'motivationsfor engag-
ing in practicesthatmisleadreadersaboutthequalityof their work.Thatsaid,weprovidejust




elsnecessarilysimplify realityto serveasusefulªthinking aidsºfor scientists[87±89].Aswith
all models,our analysisignoresmanyreal-worlddetails.Forexample,wedo not addressother
factorsthatauthorsmayconsiderwhendecidingwhereto submitapaper(e.g.,whethera
paperisabetterfit for aninterdisciplinaryor specialtyjournal),althoughour modelisgener-
ally relevantto caseswherejournalsvaryin selectivityandauthorsreceivedifferentpayoffsfor






authorsaspreferringto getall resultspublishedin high-rankingjournals.If therewerediffer-
entialbenefitsto positiveversusnegativeresults,therewouldbesomesubmissioncostat
whichauthorswouldonly benefitfrom submittingpositiveresultsto high-rankingjournals.It
isworth noting thatsomeemergingpublishingformats,suchasRegisteredReports[91], ame-
lioratethis issuebyensuringresults-blindevaluationof submissions.More generally,future
reformswouldbenefitfrom consideringhowpublishingnormsandincentivesvaryfor differ-
ent typesof researchandacrossdifferentscientificfields.
Our modelsassumethatpapersvaryin qualitybut do not addresstheprocessthatgenerates
differenttypesof papers.A potentialextensionwouldbeto allowscientiststo influencepaper
qualitybyadjustinghowmuchto investin projects(e.g.,samplesizeor methodologicalrigor
[92,93]ashasbeendonein relatedmodels[45,94±96]).Certainreforms(e.g.,greatertrans-
parency,costsfor rejectedpapers)decreasethepayofffor low-qualityresearch,andmayincen-
tivizescientiststo producemorehigh-qualityresearchin thefirst place.Further,althoughwe
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modelonetypeof strategicinteractionbetweenauthorsandjournals(seeS1File),thismodel
is too simpleto captureall interestingaspectsof journals'strategicdecisions(for otherformali-
zations,see[49,53]).Forexample,journalsthat investmorein peerreview(e.g.,soliciting
morereviews)maybemorelikely to rejectlow-qualitypapers,but publishfewerpapersthan







(but see[98]). Forexample,if thecostof mistakenlysubmittinglow-qualitywork to high-
rankingjournalsis large,scientistsmaypreferto avoidsuchmistakesbyonly submittingto
low-rankingjournals.
Weassumethatsubmissioncostsvaryonly asafunction of paperqualityandjournal type.
However,in therealworld, relativesubmissioncostsdependon otherfactors.Forexample,
well-fundedscientistswith big labscaneasilypaysubmissionfeesandoffloadcostsonto junior
labmembers(e.g.,writing grantsor coverletters),whereaslonescientistswith minimal funding
arelesscapableof doingso.All elseequal,thispredictsthatbetter-fundedscientistswill bemore
likely to submitlow-qualitywork to high-rankingjournals.Our modelsalsoassumethat the
benefitsof high- andlow-rankingpublicationsareinvariantacrossscientists.In therealworld,
thebenefitsof publicationdependon otherfactors(e.g.,careerstage,scientificvalues).For
example,well-establishedscientistsmaybenefitlessfrom high-rankingpublicationsor, alterna-
tively,maypreferto file-drawerapaperinsteadof submittingit to alower-rankingjournal.
It isalsoimportant to extendour modelsto allowfor repeatedinteractionsbetweenscien-
tistsandjournals.Severalexistingmodelsof repeatedsignalingprovideastartingpoint for
doingso.Repeatedinteractionscanensurehonestyif deceiversreceiveabadreputation(e.g.,
arenot believedin future interactions),therebymissingout on thebenefitsof long-termcoop-
erativeinteractions.If deceptioniseasilydetected,receiverscansimplynot believefuturesig-
nalsfrom apartnerwhohasbeencaughtbeingdeceptive[99]. If deceptionisdetected
probabilistically,receiverscanmoreeasilydetectdeceiversbypoolingobservationsfrom mul-
tiple individualsto form aconsensus[100].And if deceptivesignalsareneverdetectedbut can












betweenauthorsandjournals±changesin journalpolicyin onetime periodaffectoptimalsub-
missionbehaviorin subsequenttime periods,andjournaleditorswhomakepolicychanges
maythemselvesbeaffectedbysuchchangeswhentheysubmitfuturepapers[45].
Our modelsdo not addresswhethersubmissioncostsharmor benefitscience.In biological
signalingtheory,it iswell-establishedthat thehighsignalcostsnecessaryfor aseparating
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equilibrium canleaveall partiesworseoff thanin asystemwith lowersignalcostsandpartial
or completepoolingof signalsacrosstypes[33,66].Giventhedifficulty of optimallycalibrat-
ing submissioncosts,futurework couldextendour analysisto determinewhatcombinationof
honestyandsubmissioncostwould leadto themostdesirablescientificoutcomes(see[53]). It
isalsoworth noting thatsubmissioncostscanexacerbateinequalities,assubmissionsmaybe
costlierfor individualswith fewerresources(e.g.,early-careeresearchers,scientistsin devel-
opingcountries).Onesolutionis to makesubmissioncostsconditionalon scientists'ability to
paythem[39]. Thismight meanfasterreviewtimesfor early-careeresearchersor lowersub-
missionfeesfor scientistswhohavelimited funding.
Althoughwehavefocusedon theutility of signalingtheoryfor understandingreformsto aca-
demicpublishing,existingtheoreticalframeworksfrom manydisciplineswill providecomple-
mentaryinsights.Someof theseincludeeconomictheoriesof marketswith asymmetric
information [43] andpublicgoods[85], culturalevolutionarytheory[104]andits relevanceto
thescientificprocess[81,94],andstatisticaldecisiontheory[105].Drawingon diversetheoretical
frameworkswill improveour ability to implementeffectivereformsandsharpenour intuitions
abouthowincentivesarelikely to affectscientists'behavior.It will alsoimproveour theoretical
transparency,whichhasarguablylaggedbehindimprovementsin empirics[104,106±108].
Conclusion
How canwefeasiblyreformacademicpublishingto makeit morehonest,efficient,andreli-
able?Westill lackdefinitiveanswersto thisquestion.However,to theextentthatweseeka
publishingsystemin whichjournal rankcorrelateswith paperquality,our modelshighlight
severalsolutions.Theseincludemakingsubmissioncostly,makingrejectioncostly,makingit
costlierto submitlow- versushigh-qualitypapersto high-rankingjournals,reducingtherela-
tivebenefitsof low- versushigh-qualitypublicationsin high-rankingjournals,improving the
qualityof peerreview,increasingthetransparencyof submittedpapers,openlysharingedito-
rial decisionsandpeer-reviewsfor all submittedpapers,andlimiting thenumberof timesthat
paperscanbesubmittedfor publication.Reformsbasedon theseideasshouldbesubjectedto
rigoroustheoreticalandexperimentaltestbeforeimplementation.Doing sowill beour best
hopefor improving theefficiencyandreliability of science,whileminimizing therisk of collat-
eraldamagefrom theunintendedconsequencesof otherwisewell-intentionedreforms.
Supporting information
S1 Fig. Academic publishing with two-sided strategic interactions. A decisiontreewith pos-
siblemovesbybothscientistandjournals.In thefirst move,papersarerandomlydetermined
to behigh- or low-quality.In thesecondmove,thescientistchooseswhetherto submitthe
paperto eitherthehigh-rankingjournal,with or without payingthesubmissioncost,or to the
low-rankingjournal.Thehigh-rankingsubmissioncostisCh andCl for high-qualityandlow-
qualitypapers,respectively.In thethird move,ahigh-rankingjournaldecideswhetherto send
thepaperto harshor softpeerreview.Journalshaveimperfectinformation aboutpaperqual-
ity. Whenhigh-rankingjournalssendpapersto harshpeer-review,theyaccepthigh- andlow-
qualitypaperswith probabilities�Ph and�Pl, respectively.Whenhigh-rankingjournalssend
papersto softpeer-review,theyaccepthigh- andlow-qualitypaperswith probabilities�Ph and
�Pl, respectively.Low-rankingjournalsacceptall submissions.Papersrejectedfrom high-rank-
ing journalsarere-submittedto low-rankingjournals(not depicted).Dottedlinesdepictthe
journal'sinformation sets.Foreachnodein aninformation set,thejournaldoesnot knowat
whichnodetheyare.
(TIF)
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